On Wed, 3 Feb 2010 02:26:28 -0800 (PST) someone who may be MIG
wrote this:-

The scheme may have a perfectly innocent
purpose, but the agenda of the authorities who approve and fund it may
be less innocent.

If the scheme has a perfectly innocent purpose then there is no need
for excessive data gathering. If there is excessive data gathering
then one might want to ask questions why.

For example, in a manual library there is only a record of what
books someone has borrowed when the ticket is in the card [1]. The
record is destroyed when the book is handed back and the ticket and
card separated. However, in a computerised library this method of
operation is not used, instead the record of what books were
borrowed by who is kept by the system permanently. It may be that
the local staff do not have access to screens which will show this
record, but it is still there. The US Library Association had run
ins with Mr Bush's mob about the use of these records for data
mining.

It may be that someone wishes this record to be kept. Perhaps they
can't remember which books they borrowed a few weeks ago. No
problem, they can ask for it to be turned on.

It was claimed in an FoI request that the Oyster data is anonymised
after 8 weeks. However, anyone reading the reply to that request
should note carefully the weasel words about law enforcement and
that sort of stuff. The story at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/mar/16/uksecurity.terrorism
probably reveals an attempt to "legitimise" what the forces of
darkness do already.

The Home Office have recently been denying that their anti-muslim
extremist programme is a means of spying. Their denials don't
impress me, it does seem that some people have used it as a data
gathering opportunity no matter how loudly the Home Office try to
deny it.

And ultimately, if data exists, it will be used.

Yes and the courts are too much an arm of government to throw out
illegally gathered "evidence" as they are likely to do in some other
places.



[1] unless someone goes to the trouble of writing down what tickets
are in what cards, which is a lot of effort.



--
David Hansen, Edinburgh
I will *always* explain revoked encryption keys, unless RIP prevents me
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000...#pt3-pb3-l1g54