On Fri, 08 Sep 2017 13:03:37 GMT, Recliner
wrote:

From:
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/transport-for-london-may-track-commuters-via-phones-to-reduce-overcrowding-b0ss982j7?shareToken=d3406a5e9a7b95fb4dd49507b8be3 071

Commuters could be tracked using their mobile phones under plans to tackle
overcrowding and increase revenue from advertising.

Fascinating selection of routes, some of which could be accounted for
by friends/relatives travelling together with different destinations
but on the same general route.

But why do people let the world know where they are? Not using the
device is not enough, It has to be switched off to avoid tracking.
Mine is only switched on when I am willing to accept calls or need to
make a call. That only amounts to a small proportion of my waking
hours so it is more often off than on..

Guy Gorton

"Graham Murray" wrote in message news:8760cs9wja.fsf@einstein...

Basil Jet writes:

And there are two lines from Embankment to Waterloo.

At one time it would often have been quicker between Waterloo and
Embankment to walk over Hungerford Bridge. Though now that Hungerford
Bridge has been replaced by the Golden Jubilee Bridges, there is no
longer a direct walkway between them and Waterloo station.

The walkway, or rather its continuity, was broken long before the Golden
Jubilee Bridges were built.

--
Mike D

On 08/09/2017 16:21, Roland Perry wrote:
In message , at 16:07:44 on Fri, 8 Sep 2017,
Graeme Wall remarked:

Â*An evaluation of the trial, published today, shows that passengers
used 18Â* routes to go between King’s Cross/St Pancras and Waterloo,
the busiestÂ* stations on the network, with 40 per cent of people who
were trackedÂ* failing to take the two fastest routes. The data showed
that even withinÂ* stations a third of passengers did not use the
quickest routes betweenÂ* platforms and could be wasting up to two
minutes.

I'm still trying to work out 18 different ways to travel between the
two by tube.

Did you include Mornington Crescent? (Reverse at Camden Town.)

But, traditionally, invoking Mornington Crescent ends the journey.

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

On 08/09/2017 17:34, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 14:40:46 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 15:00, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 13:18:33 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 14:03, Recliner wrote:
[snip]
[TfL] said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office
about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It
said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube
network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media access
control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the phone
cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No browsing
data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of
passengers
could not be shared with third parties.
[snip]
Let's face it.Â* Even if encrypted, you cannot anonymise a MAC
address as it is unique to each phone.

You can turn it into something that can't be (realistically) turned
back into a MAC address that can be used to identify the
phone/tablet/laptop/whatever.

You don't have to turn the "anonymised" back to a MAC address to
de-anonymise the data.Â* You just encrypt a MAC address and identify
the location data in just the same manner as the tracking occurs.
Thus the location can still be re-associated with the original MAC
address.

Sure, if you know a particular MAC address and the encryption procedure
and access to the location data then you may be able (and I note Dr B's
comments in his response) to recreate the key and therefore track the
MAC address.Â* Most of us (and I again I bow to Dr B) probably can't do
that.

Surely the most likely people to want to do this would be criminals
anyway, so criminalising their activities seems slightly pointless.
Deterring casual peepers is probably worth doing.

Surely the problem is if this becomes widespread as eventually you'll
get enough data to identify not just the phone but the individual.

It's fine if it's kept to the tube, but let's take the advertising
angle, presumably the advertisers won't be satisfied with just knowing
what the busiest platform is but would prefer to target their adverts to
one or more groups of people on that platform.

By hooking up a similar system with retailers they work out that of the
group on the platform at 08:30 a significant proportion are e.g.
Waitrose shoppers. And it then goes on and on until you end up pretty
much being able to identify the iindividual, what they buy, where they
live etc without actually ever using any personally identifiable
information.

I'm not sure of the relevant legislation but presumably the only way to
avoid this is that each entity having such a system has to have a
different algorithm (or at least key) for anonymising the MAC data so
each data set remains siloised (but would the supplier of the system
still be able to join the different datasets?)

In message , at 10:23:36 on Sat, 9 Sep 2017,
Graeme Wall remarked:

I'm still trying to work out 18 different ways to travel between the
two by tube.

Did you include Mornington Crescent? (Reverse at Camden Town.)

But, traditionally, invoking Mornington Crescent ends the journey.

Or in this case ends the game of trying to think of more odd routes.
--
Roland Perry

On 09/09/2017 10:37, Someone Somewhere wrote:
On 08/09/2017 17:34, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 14:40:46 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 15:00, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 13:18:33 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 14:03, Recliner wrote:
[snip]
[TfL] said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office
about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It
said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube
network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media
access control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the
phone cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No
browsing data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of
passengers
could not be shared with third parties.
[snip]
Let's face it.Â* Even if encrypted, you cannot anonymise a MAC
address as it is unique to each phone.

You can turn it into something that can't be (realistically) turned
back into a MAC address that can be used to identify the
phone/tablet/laptop/whatever.

You don't have to turn the "anonymised" back to a MAC address to
de-anonymise the data.Â* You just encrypt a MAC address and identify
the location data in just the same manner as the tracking occurs.
Thus the location can still be re-associated with the original MAC
address.

Sure, if you know a particular MAC address and the encryption
procedure and access to the location data then you may be able (and I
note Dr B's comments in his response) to recreate the key and
therefore track the MAC address.Â* Most of us (and I again I bow to Dr
B) probably can't do that.

Surely the most likely people to want to do this would be criminals
anyway, so criminalising their activities seems slightly pointless.
Deterring casual peepers is probably worth doing.

Surely the problem is if this becomes widespread as eventually you'll
get enough data to identify not just the phone but the individual.

It's fine if it's kept to the tube,Â* but let's take the advertising
angle,Â* presumably the advertisers won't be satisfied with just knowing
what the busiest platform is but would prefer to target their adverts to
one or more groups of people on that platform.

By hooking up a similar system with retailers they work out that of the
group on the platform at 08:30 a significant proportion are e.g.
Waitrose shoppers.Â* And it then goes on and on until you end up pretty
much being able to identify the iindividual, what they buy, where they
live etc without actually ever using any personally identifiable
information.

I'm not sure of the relevant legislation but presumably the only way to
avoid this is that each entity having such a system has to have a
different algorithm (or at least key) for anonymising the MAC data so
each data set remains siloised (but would the supplier of the system
still be able to join the different datasets?)


Shopping malls have been doing a similar thing to send you "targetted
adverts" as you approach various shops.



--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

On 09/09/2017 10:41, Roland Perry wrote:
In message , at 10:23:36 on Sat, 9 Sep 2017,
Graeme Wall remarked:

I'm still trying to work out 18 different ways to travel between the
two by tube.

Â*Did you include Mornington Crescent? (Reverse at Camden Town.)

But, traditionally, invoking Mornington Crescent ends the journey.

Or in this case ends the game of trying to think of more odd routes.

Is this where I quote G K Chesterton?

--
Graeme Wall
This account not read.

Guy Gorton wrote:


But why do people let the world know where they are? Not using the
device is not enough, It has to be switched off to avoid tracking.
Mine is only switched on when I am willing to accept calls or need to
make a call. That only amounts to a small proportion of my waking
hours so it is more often off than on..



My phone OTOH is always on except when it has to be off, eg whilst driving
a train. I rarely make calls and even more rarely answer incoming calls.
When travelling by tube I often read usenet, as it's an offline thing,
whereas trying to read Facebook or anything web or forum based is difficult
with just seconds of wifi at every station stop.


Anna Noyd-Dryver

Graeme Wall writes:

Shopping malls have been doing a similar thing to send you "targetted
adverts" as you approach various shops.

How effective is this? Maybe I am unusual, but when I am shopping my
phone is normally in my pocket, so I would not see these adverts. Apart
from incoming (phone) calls, the only time I would look at my phone in a
shopping mall is when sat in a coffee shop or restaurant.

Graeme Wall wrote:
On 09/09/2017 10:37, Someone Somewhere wrote:
On 08/09/2017 17:34, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 14:40:46 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 15:00, Sam Wilson wrote:
On 2017-09-08 13:18:33 +0000, Martin Coffee said:

On 08/09/17 14:03, Recliner wrote:
[snip]
[TfL] said it was talking to the Information Commissioner’s Office
about its
plans and passengers could opt out by switching their wifi off. It
said
that the phone data was “de-personalised�, with nothing to identify
individuals.

The system works by using 1,070 wifi access points on the Tube
network.
They pick up on a code that identifies each phone, the media
access control
(MAC) address, and track them from point to point.

Each MAC address was “irreversibly� encrypted, TfL said. Prior to
encryption, a random code is added to each to ensure that the
phone cannot
be identified even if the encryption could be reversed. No
browsing data
was collected, meaning that emails and the internet habits of
passengers
could not be shared with third parties.
[snip]
Let's face it.Â* Even if encrypted, you cannot anonymise a MAC
address as it is unique to each phone.

You can turn it into something that can't be (realistically) turned
back into a MAC address that can be used to identify the
phone/tablet/laptop/whatever.

You don't have to turn the "anonymised" back to a MAC address to
de-anonymise the data.Â* You just encrypt a MAC address and identify
the location data in just the same manner as the tracking occurs.
Thus the location can still be re-associated with the original MAC
address.

Sure, if you know a particular MAC address and the encryption
procedure and access to the location data then you may be able (and I
note Dr B's comments in his response) to recreate the key and
therefore track the MAC address.Â* Most of us (and I again I bow to Dr
B) probably can't do that.

Surely the most likely people to want to do this would be criminals
anyway, so criminalising their activities seems slightly pointless.
Deterring casual peepers is probably worth doing.

Surely the problem is if this becomes widespread as eventually you'll
get enough data to identify not just the phone but the individual.

It's fine if it's kept to the tube,Â* but let's take the advertising
angle,Â* presumably the advertisers won't be satisfied with just knowing
what the busiest platform is but would prefer to target their adverts to
one or more groups of people on that platform.

By hooking up a similar system with retailers they work out that of the
group on the platform at 08:30 a significant proportion are e.g.
Waitrose shoppers.Â* And it then goes on and on until you end up pretty
much being able to identify the iindividual, what they buy, where they
live etc without actually ever using any personally identifiable
information.

I'm not sure of the relevant legislation but presumably the only way to
avoid this is that each entity having such a system has to have a
different algorithm (or at least key) for anonymising the MAC data so
each data set remains siloised (but would the supplier of the system
still be able to join the different datasets?)


Shopping malls have been doing a similar thing to send you "targetted
adverts" as you approach various shops.


'Send you' by what means?


Anna Noyd-Dryver