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#11
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On Thu, 9 Feb 2017 16:04:47 -0000 (UTC)
Recliner wrote: wrote: The vast majority of freight is hauled by class 66 and 70 diesels and the main electric freight loco the class 92 can run off 3rd rail anyway. The main electric freight loco is the class 90. Class 92s are little used. You sure about that? I thought the 90 was a passenger loco that only occasionally did light freight because its built for high speed, not pulling power. -- Spud |
#12
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wrote:
On Thu, 9 Feb 2017 16:04:47 -0000 (UTC) Recliner wrote: wrote: The vast majority of freight is hauled by class 66 and 70 diesels and the main electric freight loco the class 92 can run off 3rd rail anyway. The main electric freight loco is the class 90. Class 92s are little used. You sure about that? I thought the 90 was a passenger loco that only occasionally did light freight because its built for high speed, not pulling power. When did you last see a class 92 hauling anything? Most electric freight are hauled by class 90s. |
#13
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In message , at 15:43:03 on Thu, 9 Feb 2017,
Anna Noyd-Dryver remarked: NR's fault is (once again) lack of project management and performing checks on what was being designed/manufactured. Yes, no matter whose fault it is, it's ultimately Network Rail's fault. They are the project managers and they will have either designed the structures or else approved someone else's design; ditto with the construction. The buck stops with them. I wonder if the problem would have arisen in the days of British Rail when they (BR) did everything themselves: design, construction, project management? In other words, how much of the problem is due to the fragmented chain-of-command not-my-problem nature of modern civil engineering, where there are loads of different contractors and sub-contractors involved. Has anyone ever analysed and costed the risk of the fragmented approach? OTOH I wonder how much is down to dodgy survey work (piles couldn't actually go where intended - one of the major problems on the GWML AIUI) and also down to trying to do it in one blockade; AIUI on the GWML there are planned three month gaps between piling and steelwork, and between steelwork and wiring - AFAIK the detailed design work on the steelwork isn't done until they know exactly where the piles actually landed. And were "lessons learnt", no obviously not. -- Roland Perry |
#14
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On 09/02/2017 15:43, Anna Noyd-Dryver wrote:
NY wrote: "Roland Perry" wrote in message ... In message -septe mber.org, at 09:20:11 on Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Recliner remarked: http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co...-further-work- is-required http://www.barking-gospeloak.org.uk/...ss_release.pdf It looks like NR is trying to pass the blame on to the contractors: "Along the 14-mile route, a number of the structures, which carry the overhead lines, were incorrectly designed and couldn’t be installed at the planned locations. Late delivery of materials and structures also led to further delays." I think NR would have used different words if the faults had been its own. NR's fault is (once again) lack of project management and performing checks on what was being designed/manufactured. Yes, no matter whose fault it is, it's ultimately Network Rail's fault. They are the project managers and they will have either designed the structures or else approved someone else's design; ditto with the construction. The buck stops with them. I wonder if the problem would have arisen in the days of British Rail when they (BR) did everything themselves: design, construction, project management? In other words, how much of the problem is due to the fragmented chain-of-command not-my-problem nature of modern civil engineering, where there are loads of different contractors and sub-contractors involved. Has anyone ever analysed and costed the risk of the fragmented approach? OTOH I wonder how much is down to dodgy survey work (piles couldn't actually go where intended - one of the major problems on the GWML AIUI) and also down to trying to do it in one blockade; AIUI on the GWML there are planned three month gaps between piling and steelwork, and between steelwork and wiring - AFAIK the detailed design work on the steelwork isn't done until they know exactly where the piles actually landed. Anna Noyd-Dryver And how much is down to changes in standards for clearances between electric wiring & nearby structures, imposed after the original designs had been approved ?? (More nonsense arising from Euroland, I believe.) |
#15
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On Thu, 9 Feb 2017 16:37:46 -0000 (UTC), Recliner
wrote: wrote: On Thu, 9 Feb 2017 16:04:47 -0000 (UTC) Recliner wrote: wrote: The vast majority of freight is hauled by class 66 and 70 diesels and the main electric freight loco the class 92 can run off 3rd rail anyway. The main electric freight loco is the class 90. Class 92s are little used. You sure about that? I thought the 90 was a passenger loco that only occasionally did light freight because its built for high speed, not pulling power. When did you last see a class 92 hauling anything? Most electric freight are hauled by class 90s. Class 92s tend to be seen with Channel Tunnel traffic, there is no current reason for them to be preferred over straight 25kV locos away from such traffic. There is no sense putting in new 3rd rail between two 25kV areas; it is obsolete, requires more substations and wastes more energy. |
#17
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In article , d () wrote:
On Thu, 9 Feb 2017 10:17:56 +0000 Roland Perry wrote: In message -septe mber.org, at 09:20:11 on Thu, 9 Feb 2017, Recliner remarked: http://www.networkrailmediacentre.co...nd-gospel-oak- to-baking-route-to-reopen-on-monday-27-february-but-further-work-is-required http://www.barking-gospeloak.org.uk/...ss_release.pdf It looks like NR is trying to pass the blame on to the contractors: "Along the 14-mile route, a number of the structures, which carry the overhead lines, were incorrectly designed and couldn't be installed at the planned locations. Late delivery of materials and structures also led to further delays." I think NR would have used different words if the faults had been its own. NR's fault is (once again) lack of project management and performing checks on what was being designed/manufactured. Of course, if they'd simply installed 3rd rail they could have done it in a couple of months while the line carried on running. But thanks to stupid DoT rules about no new 3rd rail they've had to close the line for god knows how long inconveniencing 10s of thousands of people and spent 100m. I see our know-nothing Kipper correspondent has just excelled himself with his ignorance of electrical engineering. Not for nothing has all the third rail in North London been replaced with 25KV overhead electrification. A period of self-education would now be in order. -- Colin Rosenstiel |
#18
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wrote:
On Thu, 9 Feb 2017 16:04:47 -0000 (UTC) Recliner wrote: wrote: The vast majority of freight is hauled by class 66 and 70 diesels and the main electric freight loco the class 92 can run off 3rd rail anyway. The main electric freight loco is the class 90. Class 92s are little used. You sure about that? I thought the 90 was a passenger loco that only occasionally did light freight because its built for high speed, not pulling power. 12 out of service, 15 in passenger service leaves 23 in freight service. They've been regularly used for freight since their early days https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Rail_Class_90. Also don't forget the 17 class 86s still in service with Freightliner, and DRSs 88s soon to enter service. Anna Noyd-Dryver |
#19
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BevanPrice wrote:
And how much is down to changes in standards for clearances between electric wiring & nearby structures, imposed after the original designs had been approved ?? (More nonsense arising from Euroland, I believe.) You mean the failure to apply for a derogation? I never got round to posting my observations on the other thread, so I'll do it here. The changes to the permitted clearances have been detailed in posts in the other thread, with links to Roger Ford's writings on the topic. Safety rules generally do change over time, and existing installations are generally permitted to continue to operate. In this instance IIRC Network Rail could have applied for a derogation (on a structure-by-structure basis) but apparently chose not to (but not entirely - some structures definitely have much tighter clearances than others). There are three critical dimensions to be considered during this debate, however. The first is contact wire to train roof (strictly, to the track). There is of course a minimum for this, but over level crossings that dimension is much higher. The dimension which Roger seems focussed on is the catenary wire to bridge clearance. Between these two is the separation of contact wire from catenary wire. Under bridges this is squeezed much tighter - under very tight bridges the two wires are together (known as 'contenary', apparently). However on the GWML this happens comparatively rarely - ie bridges are being raised by *more* than the minimum that they need to. Presumably this is related to the desire to spec the GWML catenary for 140mph - and presumably on the basis that if you're replacing a bridge structure to raise it by X amount, the cost to raise it by another Y amount is (presumably) comparatively small. Anna Noyd-Dryver |
#20
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