On 4 Feb, 15:10, Roland Perry wrote:

In message
, at
06:43:38 on Wed, 4 Feb 2009, Mizter T remarked:

Please note that a limited number of authorised individuals within TfL
can access Oyster card data and no external organisations have direct
access to the data.

Yet, but one more terrorist outrage and it will go the way of Congestion
Charging, with all the data available to the police.

[Note that the quoted words are not mine but those of an official TfL
response to questions about access to the Oyster card database - see
upthread for the context.]

Hmm, I get where you're coming from but I'm certainly not convinced of
that - also, I think the police have always had full access to the
Congestion Charging system and cameras right from the start.

I think TfL are well aware that the integrity of the system rests on a
clear demarcation being maintained between the database and 'the
authorities', i.e. the police. I expect that the existing 'gatekeeper'
process could act in a nimble and rapid manner should that be required
- in other words it could be dealt with under the existing system.

If the police were allowed to have live access to the database or to
do data-mining 'fishing trips' (to mix my analogies) then confidence
in the system would evaporate, there would be a massive uproar and
people would kick up a big fuss, even if there had just been a
terrorist atrocity. I think the police and other authorities know this
as well. I dare say the current process whereby querying the database
is an activity removed from the police might in a way actually suit
them quite well.

In message
, at
08:01:36 on Wed, 4 Feb 2009, Mizter T remarked:
I think the police have always had full access to the
Congestion Charging system and cameras right from the start.

There was a specific change to allow this. Probably after 7/7.

If the police were allowed to have live access to the database or to
do data-mining 'fishing trips' (to mix my analogies) then confidence
in the system would evaporate, there would be a massive uproar and
people would kick up a big fuss,

I think most people would probably believe the access is already taking
place, but in secret.
--
Roland Perry

On 4 Feb, 17:11, Roland Perry wrote:

In message
, at
08:01:36 on Wed, 4 Feb 2009, Mizter T remarked:

I think the police have always had full access to the
Congestion Charging system and cameras right from the start.

There was a specific change to allow this. Probably after 7/7.

OK, I'll have to check that out then.


If the police were allowed to have live access to the database or to
do data-mining 'fishing trips' (to mix my analogies) then confidence
in the system would evaporate, there would be a massive uproar and
people would kick up a big fuss,

I think most people would probably believe the access is already taking
place, but in secret.

Perhaps they do, perhaps it is. Though if there is some kind of
secretive access to the database it would be being done by GCHQ as
opposed to the police, and they would basically only be interested in
'terrorists' and the like (the question would then be whether they'd
also be interested in tracking e.g. a militant organiser of mass
strikes - I'd think it unlikely). Oh, and spies I suppose. But I'd
think spies and indeed others 'up to (serious amounts of) no good'
would either simply not use Oyster or would otherwise use measures to
frustrate anyone attempting to track them via Oyster.

A follow on question is then the extent to which the infrastructure of
magnetic card tickets allows for tracking to take place. I'm not even
sure that individual magnetic tickets have their own unique serial
number (on the mag strip that is), which is basically what would be
required to track people using this system.

"Andrew Heenan" wrote in message
...

Fair point; In fact, I don't see some challenges to my points, because the
other joy of usenet is the killfile; Once a poster has convinced me they
are racist / overly pedantic / just plain nasty / think they own the group
/ ,

From the man who calls people pure scum.

On 4 Feb, 18:13, Paul Corfield wrote:

On Wed, 4 Feb 2009 15:10:36 +0000, Roland Perry
wrote:

In message
, at
06:43:38 on Wed, 4 Feb 2009, Mizter T remarked:
Please note that a limited number of authorised individuals within TfL
can access Oyster card data and no external organisations have direct
access to the data.

Yet, but one more terrorist outrage and it will go the way of Congestion
Charging, with all the data available to the police.

I may have missed it but where is the statement that said that the 7/7
attackers used Oyster cards to travel on the system and that the data
was used to track them - either on pre-attack surveillance trips or on
the day itself? * I thought it was CCTV recordings that were used to
identify their movements on the day and beforehand?


My reading of what Roland said, which was basically confirmed in his
later reply to one of my posts upthread, was that he was referring to
police getting access to the Congestion Charge system and cameras.

To my knowledge there was no mention of Oyster at all with regards to
the July 7th bombings investigation - I don't recall it being
mentioned at all with regards to the later July 21st failed bombings
either.


It is so ridiculously easy to travel legally on London's Transport
network and not use Oyster I fail to see why the data would be made
fully accessible to the police if we were to have another attack. *If it
was done then I suspect that confidence in the system would decline or
disappear and people would switch to non Oyster ticketing.


I concur with your thoughts. My reading of the various TfL statements
or responses that relate to privacy, access and security of the Oyster
database suggest that they are very well aware of their crucial role
as a custodian of this data too.

On Feb 4, 6:43*pm, Mizter T wrote:
On 4 Feb, 18:13, Paul Corfield wrote:





On Wed, 4 Feb 2009 15:10:36 +0000, Roland Perry
wrote:

In message
, at
06:43:38 on Wed, 4 Feb 2009, Mizter T remarked:
Please note that a limited number of authorised individuals within TfL
can access Oyster card data and no external organisations have direct
access to the data.

Yet, but one more terrorist outrage and it will go the way of Congestion
Charging, with all the data available to the police.

I may have missed it but where is the statement that said that the 7/7
attackers used Oyster cards to travel on the system and that the data
was used to track them - either on pre-attack surveillance trips or on
the day itself? * I thought it was CCTV recordings that were used to
identify their movements on the day and beforehand?

My reading of what Roland said, which was basically confirmed in his
later reply to one of my posts upthread, was that he was referring to
police getting access to the Congestion Charge system and cameras.

To my knowledge there was no mention of Oyster at all with regards to
the July 7th bombings investigation - I don't recall it being
mentioned at all with regards to the later July 21st failed bombings
either.



It is so ridiculously easy to travel legally on London's Transport
network and not use Oyster I fail to see why the data would be made
fully accessible to the police if we were to have another attack. *If it
was done then I suspect that confidence in the system would decline or
disappear and people would switch to non Oyster ticketing.

I concur with your thoughts. My reading of the various TfL statements
or responses that relate to privacy, access and security of the Oyster
database suggest that they are very well aware of their crucial role
as a custodian of this data too.-

No matter how little confidence people had in the system, raising the
cash fares sufficiently would have the desired effect.

On 4 Feb, 18:54, MIG wrote:

On Feb 4, 6:43*pm, Mizter T wrote:

On 4 Feb, 18:13, Paul Corfield wrote:

(snip)

It is so ridiculously easy to travel legally on London's Transport
network and not use Oyster I fail to see why the data would be made
fully accessible to the police if we were to have another attack. *If it
was done then I suspect that confidence in the system would decline or
disappear and people would switch to non Oyster ticketing.

I concur with your thoughts. My reading of the various TfL statements
or responses that relate to privacy, access and security of the Oyster
database suggest that they are very well aware of their crucial role
as a custodian of this data too.-

No matter how little confidence people had in the system, raising the
cash fares sufficiently would have the desired effect.

I disagree - people (a) would be willing to pay the extra as a point
of principle to avoid it, (b) would likely use the system less or
otherwise boycott it, and (c) would kick up an almighty fuss about it.

In message , at 18:13:05 on
Wed, 4 Feb 2009, Paul Corfield remarked:
Please note that a limited number of authorised individuals within TfL
can access Oyster card data and no external organisations have direct
access to the data.

Yet, but one more terrorist outrage and it will go the way of Congestion
Charging, with all the data available to the police.

I may have missed it but where is the statement that said that the 7/7
attackers used Oyster cards to travel on the system and that the data
was used to track them - either on pre-attack surveillance trips or on
the day itself?

You have imagined that scenario.

Every new big terrorist "event" causes yet more emergency legislation
and more invasion of privacy (I won't start a debate about how justified
it is, but that's plainly what happens).

We've had the Congestion Charging mission creep (July 07) and the Oyster
Card data is simply another box to tick.

--
Roland Perry

On Feb 4, 5:43*pm, Mizter T wrote:
On 4 Feb, 17:11, Roland Perry wrote:

In message
, at
08:01:36 on Wed, 4 Feb 2009, Mizter T remarked:

I think the police have always had full access to the
Congestion Charging system and cameras right from the start.

There was a specific change to allow this. Probably after 7/7.

OK, I'll have to check that out then.



If the police were allowed to have live access to the database or to
do data-mining 'fishing trips' (to mix my analogies) then confidence
in the system would evaporate, there would be a massive uproar and
people would kick up a big fuss,

I think most people would probably believe the access is already taking
place, but in secret.

Perhaps they do, perhaps it is. Though if there is some kind of
secretive access to the database it would be being done by GCHQ as
opposed to the police, and they would basically only be interested in
'terrorists' and the like (the question would then be whether they'd
also be interested in tracking e.g. a militant organiser of mass
strikes - I'd think it unlikely). Oh, and spies I suppose. But I'd
think spies and indeed others 'up to (serious amounts of) no good'
would either simply not use Oyster or would otherwise use measures to
frustrate anyone attempting to track them via Oyster.

A follow on question is then the extent to which the infrastructure of
magnetic card tickets allows for tracking to take place. I'm not even
sure that individual magnetic tickets have their own unique serial
number (on the mag strip that is), which is basically what would be
required to track people using this system.

In the early 1990s I was assured that this was possible. (Didn't I
post it somewhere?). My annual had been grabbed at a barrier, and I
was told that it could be tracked to find a pattern of use and catch
someone if they were using it.

That might not apply to every ticket, but it obviously could.

On Feb 4, 7:04*pm, Mizter T wrote:
On 4 Feb, 18:54, MIG wrote:





On Feb 4, 6:43*pm, Mizter T wrote:

On 4 Feb, 18:13, Paul Corfield wrote:

(snip)

It is so ridiculously easy to travel legally on London's Transport
network and not use Oyster I fail to see why the data would be made
fully accessible to the police if we were to have another attack. *If it
was done then I suspect that confidence in the system would decline or
disappear and people would switch to non Oyster ticketing.

I concur with your thoughts. My reading of the various TfL statements
or responses that relate to privacy, access and security of the Oyster
database suggest that they are very well aware of their crucial role
as a custodian of this data too.-

No matter how little confidence people had in the system, raising the
cash fares sufficiently would have the desired effect.

I disagree - people (a) would be willing to pay the extra as a point
of principle to avoid it, (b) would likely use the system less or
otherwise boycott it, and (c) would kick up an almighty fuss about it.-

The authorities like everyone to kick up a fuss (eg posting on
newsgroups) to get it out of their system before they buckle down. I
wish you were right.

I'm already not prepared to pay the cash fares, and my data won't only
start being stored on the day when TfL decides to hand its data over.